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工ntroduction
Economics as a Conceptual Resource 
for the Study of Public Management 
Four related bodies of knowledge inform the study and 
practice of public management. Broadest 工n scope 工 s knowledge 
about the political processes that place demands , proviàe 
opportuni 七 ies ， and impose constraints on public managers. 
Next broadest in scope is policy analysis , which provides the 
conceptual foundations and craft skills for determining what 
government should do and how it should be done. Organizational 
design , a subset of policy analysis , gives insight into how 
the public sector can be organized to facilitate the effective 
delivery of goods and services. Narrowest in scope , but most 
directly relevant to the practice of management ，工 s know工 edge
about how to carry out executive functions skillfully within 
exis 七 ing organizational designs. We take the la七 ter two 
bodies of knowledge , organizational design and executive 
function , as the core of the craft and science of public 
management. 工 n this essay we consider what the discipline of 
economics offers for research on the core of public 
management. 
Economics certainly has made fundamental contributions to 
the conceptual and technical development of policy analysis. 
Through the public choice perspective , it has also contributed 
in important ways to the understanding of political processes. 
But what has economics contributed directly to public 
management? The short answer is mainly some insight into 
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organizational design. Of course , being academics , we are not 
content with giving just the short answer , especially because 
we see some developments in economics that may eventually 
contribute to our fundamental understanding of executive 
function. 
Economists have not been shy about applying their 
disciplinary tools to the study of a variety of non-market 
behaviors such as crime , fertility , and rent seek工ng. Yet the 
non-market behavior most central to the study of the economy , 
that which occurs within firms , public bureaus , and other 
organizations that produce goods and services , has only 
recently become part of the mainstream of the discipline. The 
pioneering work of Ronald Coase (工 937) on transaction costs as 
an explanation for the existence of firms did not attract many 
economists to the topic. More influential was the notion that 
in competitive markets only those firms that acted as if they 
maximized profits , implicitly choosing the most efficient 
organizational form , would survive (Alchian , 1950). The 
assumed efficiency of the "what is" makes the particulars of 
organization seem less interesting. Concern about the optimal 
design of information sharing among organizational members 
with identical goals prompted some interest in the theory of 
teams (Marschak , 1955). Yet with a few very notable 
exceptions (Downs , 1966; Niskanen , 1971) , economists tended to 
ignore public sector organizations , which usually are no仁
subject to the competitive discipline that in theory drives 
private firms toward efficiency. Further , early explorations 
of behavior within firms (Cyert and March , 1963) and the 
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structure of firms (Williamson , 1975) seemed to many 
economists to stray too far from the dominant neoclassical 
paradigm of constrained optirnization by rat 工onal actors. It 
was only with the introduction of the principal-agent 
frarnework , which preserved the core assurnptions of 
neoclassical economics , that questions of organizational 
design have moved into the mainstream of economics. 
For purposes of this essay , we delineate econornics as the 
body of theory and related ernpirical research that relies on 
the comparison of equilibria resulting from the choices of 
individuals with stable preferences who act rationally to 
maximize their welfare. These concepts -- stable preferences , 
rational choices by individuals , and comparable equilibria --
comprise the core assumptions of neoclassical economics. In 
its simplest and most simplistic form , neoclassical economics 
adds the peripheral assumptions of the budget as the only 
relevant constraint , perfect informatio口， and costless market 
exchange. We follow Thrainn Eggertsson (工 990) in classifying 
models that preserve the core assumptions of neoclassical 
economics , but relax the secondary assumptions , as belonging 
to neoinstitutional economics. In particular , 
neoinstitutional economics introduces rnore detailed 
specifications of the situational constraints that individuals 
face , of the types of inforrnation that they have , and of the 
nature of the interactions in which they engage. The 
increasing specificity of these peripheral assumptions pushes 
econornic theory closer to topics of concern to students of 
public rnanagement. 
法
One can imagine two routes by which economics can 
influence public management. First , publ 工 c managers can draw 
concepts and analytical techniques directly from economics. 
By understanding the economic aphorism , "the scarces七 resource
gets the rent , " or 七he broadly applicable concepts of moral 
hazard and adverse selection , for example , a manager may be 
better able to avoid ineffective organizational designs. 
Familiarity with the techniques of benefit-cost analysis may 
enable a manager to pursue more skillfully what Michael 
Barzelay (1992) calls the post-bureaucratic paradigm 
emphasizing the consumer perspective , net rather than gross 
values , and the inclusion of nonpecuniary costs (p. 工 21) . 
Second , economics can indirectly influence public managers by 
providing the conceptual frameworks employed by public 
managemen七 researchers. With respect to organizational 
design , for instance , such concepts as sustainable 
competition , contestability , and credible commitment may 
suggest very different ways of thinking about the delivery of 
services. An economic theory of institutions based on 
equilibria in repeated games may provide a clear conceptual 
foundation f o r thinking about such elusive phenomena as 
leadership and organizational culture. 
工 n this essay we speak more to researchers than 
practitioners. Rather than attempting to catalogue the 
concepts and techniques that are potentially useful to 
practitioners systematically , we provide examples of important 
general concepts that might be usefully transferred from 
. various economic approaches to the substantive problems of 
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public management. Though most of these concepts are relevant 
to issues of organizational design , a few may be useful in 
helping to understand the executive function better. 
We begin by considering the concept of market failure in 
neoclassical economic theory. Next we rev工 ew the agency 
theory and transaction cost branches of neoinstitutional 
economics. Though subs 七 ant 工vely more often thought of as the 
domain of political science , we consider the application of 
social choice theory to organizational decision making. 
Finally , we turn to game theoretic models of institutions , 
which provide a new sort of "general equilibrium" in that they 
can explain the existence of conventions and adherence to 
rules without resort to external authority. 
Neoclassical Economic Theory 
The ideal paradigm of neoclassical economics , the Arrow-
Debreu (工 954) general equ 工 l 工brium framework , simply assumes 
all production occurs within technically efficient firms that 
maximize profits. Thus , it does not speak to questions of 
interest to students of public management. Yet consideration 
of the normat 工ve 工mplicat 工 ons of the violation of the 
assumptions of the ideal neoclassical paradigm , the subject of 
welfare econom工 cs ， does offer some concepts of relevance to 
organizational design. In particular , the traditional market 
failures -- public goods , externalities , natural monopoly , and 
information asymmetry -- can be very useful in diagnosing the 
sort of intra-organizational problems that public managers 
routinely face. 
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The fundamental welfare theorem , which formalizes the 
notion of the "invisible hand ," serves as the basis for 
normative neoc 工 assical economics. 工 t says that , in an 
idealized economy satisfying certain assumptions about 
consumer preferences , production technology , the nature of 
goods and factor inputs , information , and the existence of 
competitive markets , an equilibrium in prices and quantities 
of goods and factors exists and that it is Pareto efficient. 1 
That is , it wou工 d not be possible to find a reallocation that 
would make someone better off without making anyone else worse 
off. 
Certain violations of the assumptions of the fundamental 
welfare theorem , which can be analyzed within the neoclassical 
framework , comprise the traditional market failures that lie 
at the operational heart of welfare economics. They involve 
situations in which rational behavior by individuals results 
in equilibria that are not Pareto efficient in the sense that 
alternative allocations can be identified that could make at 
least some people better off without mak工ng anyone else worse 
off. 
An economic approach to policy analysis seeks market 
failures as rationales for affirmative public policy. 
Further , associated with each of the market failures are a 
number of generic IIS0工utions" that provide starting points for 
designing policy alternatives. For example , in situations 
involving externalities , characterized by a gap between 
marginal private costs and marginal social costs , one generic 
solution is for government to impose a tax or provide a 
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subsidy that closes the gap. Other generic solutions to 
externality problems include direct regulation of the activity 
generating the externality and allowing those who bear a 
negative externality to seek compensation through tort from 
those who generate it. Thus , framing pol 工cy problems as 
marke 七 failures naturally leads the analyst to candidate 
solutions. 
Though welfare economics frames these failures in the 
neoclassical world of market exchange , we believe that they 
provide a useful conceptual resource for understanding 
behavior within organizations , and , therefore , potentially 
offer insight into effective organizational des 工gn and more. 
The production and exchange of intermed工 ate products among 
organizational members , and the production and delivery of 
final products to the customers of the organization , can be 
viewed as occurring in intra-organizational markets. This may 
strike some readers as a bit curious as one explanation for 
七 he existence of hierarchial organizations is that they are 
responses to market failures that make spot transactions 
unsatisfactory. Organizations substitute to some extent 
hierarchies of authority for market exchange. Members subject 
themselves to hierarchical authority in return for an ongoing 
rela七 ionship providing some package of monetary and non-
monetary compensation. Yet , because the direct exercise of 
authority is costly in terms of specifyin弓， monitoring , and 
enforcing directives , organizations typically delegate 
considerable discretion to their members. Thus , in many 
spheres of organizational life , members are free to purse 
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their self-interest within very broad constraints. Their 
interactions can be thought of as occurr工ng 工n organizational 
markets where expenditures of time and effort are generally 
the relevant prices. 
This perspective makes the d工 st 工nction between markets 
and hierarchies less significant. Markets embody some 
hierarchy -- typically a cen七 rally enforced system of property 
rights , but also perhaps var工 ous regula七 ion by government 
agencies. Within hierarchical organizations considerable 
discretion is often delegated to people whose behavior can be 
understood as the pursuit of self- 工nterest subject to various 
administrative constraints. 工ndeed ， the boundaries of 
hierarchical organizations become blurred when they contract 
with non-members for the provision of services. 
We develop the organizational market fa 工 lure framework 
more systematically elsewhere (Weimer and V工n工ng ，工 992 ， pp. 
工 3 工-工 38; Vining and Weimer ，工 990 and 1993). We offer here 
only a few illustrations 工 n an effort to convey the usefulness 
of this approach as a conceptual resource for diagnosing and 
managing organizational problems. 
Achieving a favorable organizational reputation. A 
favorable reputation is valuable to both the organization and 
its members. A reputation for customer service may enable a 
private firm to expand its market; a reputation for competence 
and efficiency may enable a government bureau to secure more 
resources and greater jurisdiction from its political 
sponsors. Organizational members may find their job easier 
and more pleasurable when their organization has a favorable 
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reputation. Nevertheless , departments of motor vehicles and 
many other organizations we routinely encounter have 
difficulty establishing and maintaining favorable reputations. 
The reason is that reputation is a public good for the 
organizational members. 
A private good is rivalrous (only one person can use it 
at a time) and excludable (a particular person has exclusive 
control over its use). A pure public good like organizational 
reputation is neither rivalrous (new members benefit from the 
reputation without reducing its benefits to ex工 sting members) 
nor excludable (short of expulsion from the organization , no 
member can be excluded from its benefits). The chronic 
problem of pure public goods is undersupply. 
Members of organizations typically produce both private 
and public goods. The production of private goods is easy to 
monitor 一- number of cases processed , dollar value of sales , 
units of product delivered. The production of public goods is 
typically much more difficult to monitor -- courtesy to 
customers , extra effort to solve a customer's or colleague's 
problem , reliability of final and intermediate products. 
Organizational reward systems are typically based only on 
private good production because of these differences in the 
ease of monitoring. 
In order to elicit supply of an organizational public 
good , managers must find ways of either rewarding actions that 
contribute to it or penalizing actions that undermine it. 
Making public examples of reputation-enhancing and reputation-
detracting actions that come to the manager's attention is one 
~ 
approach. Another approach is to make the discovery of 
examples more systematic through soliciting or sampling 
customer opinions about the quality of the performance of 
organizational members. In situations in which co-workers can 
observe each other's act 工ons ， they may be involved in the 
monitoring and rewarding process through such devices as 
"quality c 工 rcles." The general point is that managers should 
expect organizational public goods to be undersupplied without 
some sor七 of authoritative 工ntervention to encourage 
prov工 S 工 on.
We assume that managers are willing to expend effort to 
increase the supply of organizat 工 onal publ 工 c goods. The 
managers of government bureaus with monopoly positions , 
however , may not be willing to put effort into increasing 
organizationa工 public goods , because they do not have to 
compete for customers. Further , civil service may make it 
difficult for them to create incentives to motivate workers to 
provide public goods. Thus , relative to private 
organizations , government bureaus are likely to have lower 
levels of organizational public goods like favorable 
reputat 工 on.
Overuse of resources. Often organizational resources 
such as secretarial capacity , the time of employees with 
specialized skills , and shared computer systems are overused 
and eventually depleted or degraded. Overuse usually occurs 
when the goods have the characterist 工 c of common property: 
they are rivalrous but not excludable. The generic solution 
to common property problems is to convert them to private 
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goods by introducing excludability through such means as 
establishing user prices or giving "property rights" over use 
to a specific person. 
Consider the case of a shared computer system. 工 t is 
qui 七 e possible that at the time the systern was introduced into 
the organization , demand for comput 工ng at zero price was 
sufficiently low so that no queuing occurred. As the 
organization grows , however , demand grows sufficiently to 
create queuing and other degradations of service. A natural 
solution is to introduce fees to discourage relatively low-
valued uses so that rema工n工ng users do not bear the costs of 
queuing. But to be effect 工ve ， the fees must be denorninated in 
units that have some other value to organizational rnembers. 
Unless unspent funds in individual computer budgets can be 
used Íor other things of value 七o organiza七 ional mernbers , such 
as equipment or travel , they will have no incentive to spend 
less than the full amount on computing. 工 ndeed ， if they 
anticipate that subsequent allocations will depend on current 
spending , then they have an incentive to be sure that they 
spend t h e entire account. Though the aggregate amount of 
budget allocations can be set to avoid queuing , sufficient 
information to provide individual budgets to facilitate most 
valued uses is unlikely to be available. The result may be 
inefficiency in excess of that caused by queuing. 
Government bureaus typically face more severe constraints 
in establishing fungible budgets than do private firms. Line 
item budgeting and constraints on the conversion of unused 
organizational resources to private income preclude designs 
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available to private firms. Nevertheless , one of the thrusts 
of "reinventing government" is to allow at least managers to 
have fungible budgets (Osborne and Gaebler , 1992: 工工 9 -122). As 
we discuss later , however , such systems suffer from a lack of 
credibility. 
Natural resources owned as common property often are 
depleted. Yet the users of common property resources 
sometimes develop governance systems that , while not 
necessarily achieving efficient utilization levels , preserve 
the resources over extended periods. Based on the observation 
of a large number of common property resources , Elinor Ostrom 
(1990) has distilled a number of design principles that seem 
to characterize those that are long-enduring. For example , 
such factors as mutual monitoring by users , participation in 
the determination of appropriation rules by all users , and the 
fitting of appropriation rules to local conditions appear to 
contribute to longevity. Transferring these design principles 
to organizational common property suggests that allowing 
workgroups to set rules for their use might be a promising 
approach to preventing their degradation. 
Undersupply of specialized resources. As a final 
illustration , consider a situation in which an organization 
relies on a particular member for expertise in an area such as 
law , accounting , or engineering. Supply of the in-house 
expertise may have the characteristics of a natural monopoly: 
over the relevant range of demand for the expertise the 
average cost of its provision is falling because demand can be 
accommodated by a single person ‘ The cost of the expert's 
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emp10yment contract can be thought of as a fixed costi the 
manageria1 effort and user inconven工ence invo1ved in inducing 
the expert to de1iver the expertise can be thought of as the 
variab1e cost. Natura1 rnonopo1ists have an 工ncentive to 
restrict supp1y in order to dr工ve up pr工 ce and gain rents. 
The monopo1y supp1ier of organizationa1 expertise may 
simi1ar1y restrict effor七 to enjoy an easier 1ife or obtain 
rents , though the higher "price" that resu1ts may be 
manifested as deference , queuing , or even bribes of some sort. 
工 n recent years the concept of contestabi1ity has been 
introduced to the study of natura1 monopo1y (Baumo1 , Panzar 
and Wi11ig , 1982). A monopo1y is contestab1e if there are 
potentia 1 a1ternative supp1iers of the good. 工 t is not 
contestab1e if there are barriers to entry , such as cost1y 
organization-specific investments in human capita1 that have 
substantia11y 1ess va1ue in other uses. If the monopo1y is 
con七 estab1e ， then the monopo1 工 st can be expected to 工 imit
prices to d工 scourage takeovers. If it is not , then the 
monopo1ist can raise price to maximize rent without concern 
about 10ss of the monopo1y. 
工 ncreasing the contestabi1ity of supp1y is one strategy 
for managers to improve the performance of monopo1y supp1iers 
within their organizations. For examp1e , barriers to entry 
may be 10wered by creating circumstances , such as task forces 
and apprent 工 ceships ， in wh工 ch the monopo1y supp1ier revea1s 
information to other organ工 zationa1 members. Resistance to 
such strategies often appear as "turf wars" with members who 
enjoy monopo1y positions guarding the information and 
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authorities that function as barriers to entry. 
In situations involving the supply of a specialized 
resource by a group of organizational members , they may 
collude to obtain monopoly rent for the group as a whole. A 
well-known example is the account provided by Michel Crozier 
(工 964) of French mechanics who used intimidation and sabotage 
to prevent others from acquiring or exercising expertise 
concerning factory machines. Managers may try to break up 
such cartels by weakening the social relations among the 
colluders , say by dispersing them to line units rather than 
keeping them as a staff function. In the creation of 
positions in organizations , managers should keep in mind that 
job classifications in union contracts and civil service 
regulations may be helpful to group members in creating 
barriers to entry. 
Summary: The underlying importance of info r.mation 
asymmetry. Information asymmetry arises when some members of 
the organization have information that they can withhold from 
other members. Organizational inefficiency results if the 
information is withheld when providing it would reduce 
organizational costs by more than the cost of its provision. 2 
Though we focussed on pure public goods , common property 
problems , and natural monopoly in illustrating how market 
failure concepts can be useful to managers in diagnosing and 
correcting commonly encountered organizational pathologies , 
one of the other traditional market failures , information 
asymmetry , was implicitly involved in each of these 
illustrations through the assumption that monitoring of the 
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behavior of organizational members by managers is costly. 
Indeed , it is the information asymmetry that generally allows 
the other market failures to occur in the presence of 
hierarchical authority that could correct them through fiat. 
The central thrust of neoinstitutional economics is to make 
assumptions about information asymmetry explicit rather than 
implicit. 
Neoinstitutional Economics: Ownership，工nformation ， and 
Transaction Costs 
Neoinstitutional economics has developed along two 
tracks. 3 Agency theory formalizes assumptions abou七 the
distribution of property rights and information in the writing 
of contacts that define organizations. Transaction cost 
theory explicitly considers the nature of the interaction 
between economic agents and its relation to forms of 
organiza七 ion for governing contracts. The formal application 
of these theories to pr己 C 七 ical problems of organizational 
design has as of yet been very limited. 工 n the case of agency 
theory , the formal models have incorporated very simple 
assumptions and produced very general propositions , often 
without immediately apparent empirical applicationi less 
formal models have yielded testable implications concerning 
corporate structure and control that have generally been 
confirmed by empirical research. 4 With the possible exception 
of bargaining models , which have actually developed as an 
independent line of research , transaction cost theory has yet 
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to develop formal models. Nevertheless , both these approaches 
provide useful general insight into organizational design. 
Agency theory. Organ工 zations can be viewed as 
collections of explicit and implicit contracts , typica工 ly
covering periods of longer duration than single transactions 
and generally characterized by the incomplete specification of 
all contingencies. 5 Agency theory deals with the design of 
these contracts. 工 n particular , it focusses on the 
relationship between principals and agents who exercise 
authority on their behalf. 
Though we normally think of agency theory in terms of 
hierarchies with managers as principals and workers as agents , 
ironically one of the seminal works on agency theory considers 
just the opposite case. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz 
(工 972) propose an explanation for the existence of firms based 
on the problem of shirking in team production. A situation is 
characterized by team production when it is costly to monitor 
the contributions made by each of the team members to the 
group output. Team members have an incentive to shirk because 
they each bear the full costs of their effort but only share a 
fraction of the output. Each team member would be better off 
if no one shirked than if everyone did. Realiz 工ng this , they 
may decide to hire a manager who can monitor their behavior to 
eliminate shirking. But how do they keep the manager from 
shirking? One solution is to write a contract that pays 
workers fixed amounts (wages) and gives rights to the residual 
of revenue over cost (profit) to the manager. Thus results a 
firm owned by the manager. 
工 6
At about the same time , Stephen Ross (1973) introduced 
formal techniques for modelling principal-agent relationships.6 
The problem facing the principal is to design a contract that 
specifies payrnent to the agent as a function of observable 
quantities such that the agent receives some minimal expected 
utility and the principal's expected utility is maximized by 
the agent's self-interested responses to the provisions of the 
contract. In the simplest formulation , the output produced is 
a function of the agent's effort and the realization of some 
random variable observable only by a risk-neutral agent. The 
optimal contract in such situations is often of the form of a 
franchise: the agent pays a fee to the principal and then 
keeps the en七 ire value of the output. 
One of the more thoroughly explored lines of development 
of the formal model , which leads to more commonly observed 
employment contracts , has involved consideration of the 
consequences of assuming that agents are more risk averse than 
principals (Stiglitz , 1974 , 1975; Holmstrom , 1982). 工n such 
cases , opt 工mal contracts typically shift some risk to the 
principal but as a consequence agents have lower effor七 levels
than they would in the case of risk neutrality. Other 
extens 工 ons cons 工 der situations in which the principal can 
observe a signal correlated with the agent's effort 
(Holmstrom ，工 979) ， multiple agents compete in tournaments 
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz , 1983) , agents perform multiple tasks 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom ，工 99 工)， and agents are the principals 
for other agents (Laffont , 1990). For non-technical surveys 
of the literature using formal principal-agent models , see 
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Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole (1989) , David E. M. Sappington 
(1991) , and Jeffrey Banks (1995). 
Unfortunately , the formal pr工nc 工pal-agent rnodels often do 
not provide predictions that can be directly tested 
ernpirically (Holmstrom and T工 role ，工 988: 105).7 Some related 
empirical work does offer practical insights into 
organizational design. Cons 工der ， for example , Charles 
Knoeber's (1989) study of the broiler industry that has been 
extrernely successful in reducing the real price of chicken 
over the last 30 years. Large wholesalers , called 
integrators , typically ernploy tournarnents among sets of 
independent growers. 工 n each tournarnent growers receive 
similar allotments of ch工 cks ， feed , and medicine. The price 
they receive per pound of delivered chicken depends on how 
efficiently they use the inputs relative to others in the 
tournarnent. The use of tournaments in this industry is 
theoretically consistent with forrnal principal-agent models in 
tha七七he growers face cornrnon randorn effects due to 
temperature , epidemics , and experirnental changes in the 
genetic stock of chicks. It provides a way of reducing these 
systernatic sources of risk to growers by generating 
inforrnation about their relative rather than just their 
absolute performances. 
Though some examples of the use of tournaments in the 
public sector can be found (Fong , 1986; Church and Heumann , 
1989) I they might be more commonly ernployed to maintain 
cornpetition (Weimer , 1992). Specific applications arise in 
the context of dual-sourcing for goods purchased by the 
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government (Riordan and Sappington , 1989; An ton and Yao ，工 990)
and competitive franchising (Hazlett , 1990). The general 
design concept for public managers to keep in mind is that 
they may be able to generate useful information about 
production costs through on-go工ng tournaments among 
contractors , regional offices , or other groups that produce 
similar products. 
Chistopher Hall's (1986) study of claiming races 
suggests another general design concept: inducing the 
production or revelation of information through the creation 
of appropriable value (Weimer , 1992). A high percentage of 
horse races at North American tracks are claiming races in 
which any horse can be purchased (cla 工med) for a set price. 
By setting purses sufficiently above the claim price , some 
owners will be induced to enter horses worth more than the 
claim . The possibility of the availability of these bargains 
induces other buyers to monitor horses , thereby increasing the 
chances that switched horses will be detected and reducing the 
chances that owners will hold back horses in prior races to 
manipulate odds. Claiming thus reassures bettors about the 
accuracy of public inÍormation about horses. 
One type of applicat 工on is in the enforcement of laws. 
The setting of "bounties" can be used to induce decentralized 
enforcement. Care must be taken , however , to align the 
incentives closely to goals or inappropriate enforcement may 
result. For example , because the "citizen suit" provisions of 
the Clean Water Act do not tie bounties to the magnitude of 
environmental damage , they appear not to be contributing to 
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social efficiency (Greve ，工 989). A more worrying example is 
the provision in many state forfeiture laws allowing police 
departments to keep all , or a large fraction , of property they 
seize from people accused of drug-related crimes -- it creates 
not only an incentive to go after large asset holders rather 
than major offenders but also an invitation to corruption. 
Another application is in the creation of rules that 
induce the revelation of information through forced 
transactions. Examples include: generating information about 
the costs of regulations by requiring firms to make estimates 
of how much a regulatory standard wil1 cost and to pay tha七
amount to any outside contractor who can a1ter equipment to 
meet the stanèard (Stonselie and Portney，工 983) i and 
generating information about the value of natura1 resources 
for purposes of taxation by requiring owners to state a value 
and sell the resource at that value to any c1aimant. Though 
these particu1ar applications are not necessarily desirable , 
they suggest how thinking exp1icitly about information can 
1ead to consideration of organizationa1 designs that might 
otherwise be overlooked. 
A 1ess formal , but empirically richer , strain of agency 
theory focusses on the affect of different structures of 
property rights for organizationa1 efficiency. 工 t was 
formulated in the seminal article on agency cost by Michae1 
Jensen and Wil1iam Meckling (工 976). Agency costs inc1ude "the 
costs of structuring , monitoring , and bonding a set of 
contracts among agents with conflicting interests , p1us the 
residua1 10ss incurred because the cost of fu11 enforcement of 
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contracts exceeds the benefits" (p. 305). Bonding refers to 
arrangements made by the agents to raise the costs of their 
not complying. For example , in the case of owners as 
principals and managers as agents , bonding might include the 
promise to have audits conducted by independent accountants or 
an agreement to hold stock that cannot be sold during the 
manager's tenure. (Blue ribbon advisory panels and 
independent internal investigation units may have a similar 
function for public managers.) The theory has been used to 
produce testab工 e hypotheses about the relationship between 
monitoring costs and ownership structures in such industries 
as property and casualty insurance (Mayers and Smith , 1988) 
Agency theory also has relevance to the issue of state 
versus priva仁 e ownership of organizations. Politicians serve 
as the principals for state-owned organ工 zat 工 ons. In contrast 
to private owners , who can claim the res 工dual of the 
organization , electoral competition and civil service laws 
generally preclude political pr工nc 工pals from d工 rectly taking 
the residual as personal gain. Unlike private owners , 
individual politicians cannot transfer ownership to others. 
This nontranferability of public organizations discourages 
specialization in their ownership , so that less effective 
monitoring of management may result (De Alessi ，工 983; Lot 仁，
1987). Public agencies usually have multiple principals so 
that managers may receive conflicting and unstable political 
demands (Moe , 1984). Further , a principal-agent relationship 
exists between voters and politicians encouraging oversight to 
discover sensa七 ional instances of fraud , waste , and abuse that 
21 
wil 工 catch the attention of voters rather than more mundane 
monitoring of the efficiency of routine operations. These 
factors suggest that , other things being equal , privately-
owned organizations will be more efficient than state-owned 
organ工 zat 工ons.
A theoretically important "other thing" is the degree of 
competition that the organization faces in its product 
markets. One way to hold the degree of competition equal is 
to limit the comparison of ownership forms to organizations 
that sell their output in competitive markets. Doing so gives 
support to the hypothesis that private ownership is more 
efficient than public ownership (Boardman and Vining ，工 989;
Vining and Boardman , 1992). Differences in the effectiveness 
of oversight helps explain why public managers are generally 
given less discretion than their private counterparts. 
Control can be accomplished through a combination of ex ante 
rules and ex post oversight(Thompson and Jones ，工 986). When 
ex post mon工 tor工 ng is rela七 ively less effect 工ve ， we expect 
greater reliance on ex ante rules such as strict prohibitions 
against personal expropriation of organizational resources , 
工 ine item budgets , and restrictions on patronage. 
Transaction cost theory. As with agency theory , the 
focus of transaction cost theory is the contract (Williamson , 
工 985). But unlike agency theory , which usually treats agents 
as simply reacting to contracts designed by principals , 
transaction cost theory views the part 工 es attempt 工ng to engage 
in exchange (a transaction) as contracting both the terms of 
the exchange and their execut 工on. The contracting process 工 S
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cost1y. It inc1udes not on1y the structuring , monitoring , 
bonding , and residua1 10ss costs of agency theory , but a1so 
the costs of negotiation. At one 1eve1 , transaction cost 
theory considers the nature of specific types of transactions. 
At a broader 1eve1 , it is concerned with which institutiona1 
arrangements best faci 工 itate and economize which kinds of 
transac七 ions (Wi11iamso口 ，工 985; Maser ，工 986; Heckathorn and 
Maser ，工 987; Bryson and Ring ，工 990) . 
Doug1as Hekathorn and Steven Maser (工 987) identify three 
important prob1ems that contribute to the costs of 
contracting. Firs仁 a "cooperation prob1em" arises when a 
contract cou1d offer a11 parties gain re1ative to the absence 
of a c ontract. To achieve a mutua11y beneficia1 contract , 
howe v er , the parties must expend transact 工on resources that 
inc1ude "(工) the prerequ工 S 工 tes for negot 工 at 工ng ， for examp1e , 
communication channe1s w工 th which to bargain ，工ndependent
sources of pertinent information with which to assess 
competing c1aims , and information processing capacities; and 
(2) the prerequisites for enforcing contracts , for instance , 
the abi1ity to monitor comp1iance and to sanction 
noncomp1iance" (p. 76). Second , a "àivision prob1em" arises 
when different mutua11y beneficia1 contracts offer different 
re1ativ e gains. The parties may expend bargaining resources 
and effort attempting to secure more favorab1e contracts for 
themse1ves. Third , a "defection prob1em" arises when non-
comp1iance 工 s in the se1f- 工nterest of any of the parties. 
Because it is impossib1e to anticipate a11 contingencies in 
the writing of contracts , parties somet 工mes have opportunities 
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to withhold contributions without being subjected to 
anticipated sanctions or to force re-negotiation of terms 
through threats of non-compliance. 。
Transactions often involve investments by one or more of 
the parties in specific assets , such as specialized equipment 
or knowledge , that have much lower value in uses other than as 
part of the transaction. Parties who invest in specific 
assets are especially vulnerable to threats of non-compliance. 
Therefore , they may be unwilling to en七 er into contracts 
unless they receive credible commitments that other parties 
will not behave opportunistically in exploiting their 
vulnerability. A central question of political economy is how 
governments can make cred工ble comm工 tments to convince people 
that their investments will not be expropriated (Rodrik and 
Zeckhauser ，工 988; North and Weingast ，工 989; Root ，工 989; Riker 
and Weimer ，工 993) and that the money supply will not be 
debased (Blackburn and Christensen ，工 989). But the problem of 
credible commitment is pervasive at all levels of 
n 0 .工←」a z -L n a qd r o 
Return to the problem of establishing fungible budgets 
for public managers. The expenditure control budget advocated 
by Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 工 19-122) allows managers to 
carry unspent funds over from one fiscal period to the next. 9 
Transaction cost theory suggests that we should be skeptical 
about its use in circumstances in which the manager and the 
central budget office do not already have a trusting 
relationship. The reason is that the manager must anticipate 
the possibility that the budget office will expropriate the 
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savings by reducing the base budget in the next period. 工 f
this happens , the manager wou1d not on1y 10se the 
discretionary use of the savings but she wou1d a1so have 
revea1ed information about the true costs of de1ivering output 
that cou1d weaken her bargaining pos 工℃工on 工n the future. What 
appears to be needed is some mechanism that makes the 
commitment no七 to expropriate the savings credib1e. One 
possibi1ity is to create a sort of "Swiss bank" that concea1s 
information about savings from the budget office (Weimer , 
1992) . 
The risk of opportunism has obvious re1evance to the 
issue of privatization. Competition may be very 工ntense when 
a contract for provision of some service is initia11y put out 
for bids. Once a firm has won the bid , its specific 
investments in know1edge about producing the service create a 
barrier to entry that makes the contract 1ess contestab1e in 
the future. If 10ss or degradation or the service is 
particu1ar1y costly to public orficials , then the firm will 
enjoy a favorable bargaining position for renegotiating 
contract terms. Of course , the government can act 
opportunistica11y with respect to emp10yees and supp1iers who 
make organizationa1ly specific investments. civil service 
tenure is one way for the government to make a credible 
commitment that it will not exp10it workers who have invested 
in deve10ping expertise with 1itt1e va1ue outside the 
organ工 zat 工 on.
One of the specific assets of firms and units of 
government is the trust they engender by virtue of their track 
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records in supplying goods and services. By demonstrating a 
general reliab工工工 ty they create a barrier to contestability 
that advantages them in negotiating the terms of contracts 
which allow them to operate above minimum cost. Substitute 
monitoring capability for trust may contribute to more 
efficient supply. Ironically , therefore , one way to make 
privatization more effective may be to invest in the core 
analytical and manager工 al funct 工ons of public organizations 
(Vining and Weimer ，工 990) . 
Social Choice Theory and 工ntraorganizational Decision Making 
Social choice theory considers the relationship between 
individual preferences and social preferences. Arrow's 
General Possibil 工 ty Theorem ra 工 ses a fundamental limitation to 
collective choice: no social choice rule can simultaneously 
satisfy minimal conditions of fairness (there is no 
dictatorshipi all transitive preference orderings for 
individuals are permittedi 工 f one alternative if preferred by 
every indiv工dual over another , then 工仁工 s soc 工 ally preferredi 
the choice rule is not arbitrary in that it wil 工 consistently
produce the same social ordering from the same individual 
orderings) and simultaneously guarantee a transitive social 
ordering of alternatives (Arrow ，工 963). Most applications of 
Arrow's theorem concern the characteristics of vot 工ng systems , 
though it applies to any social choice rule. In particular , 
it applies to decentralized decision making within 
organ工 zatlons.
The Liberal Paradox of Amartya Sen (1970) , which replaces 
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the condi 七 ion of non-dic七atorship with one of minimal 
delegation , gives a result similar to Arrow's when applied to 
organizational decision rnaking. 工n part 工 cular ，工 f there are 
at least two individuals or organ工 zat 工ona工 subunits that each 
have the authority to rank order at least one pair of 
alternatives , then no decision rule can guarantee both Pareto 
efficiency and transitivity of organ工 zat 工onal cho工 ces for all 
combinations of individual preferences. This result can be 
seen as a fundamental theoretical limit to organizational 
performance (Hammond and Miller ，工 985; Mi 工 ler I 工 992) . 
Pareto efficiency and transit 工V工 ty at the level of the 
organization can be achieved by abandon工ng the condition of . 
unrestricted preferences. One way to do this is to establish 
a clear corporate culture that leads , through selective 
recruitmen仁 to members w工 th homogeneous preferences. Doing 
so , however , may be at the cost of excluding some types of 
expertise that are correlated with excluded preference 
profiles. For example , excluding economists from a 
substantiv e line agency may make for a more homogeneous 
corporate cul 七ure but depr工ve the agency of expert 工 se valuable 
in some circumstances. Further , as Thomas Hammond and Gary 
Miller (工 985) point out , the fundamental limitation may 
reappear when decision-making authority in a government is 
distributed across agencies with distinct corporate cultures. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The simple spatial vo七 ing model presented in Figure 1 
graphically illustrates the fundamental problem of social 
choice and . the potential role of institutional rules in 
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overcoming i 七 ~O The horizontal axis represents a continuous 
policy dimension , say the size of the social welfare program 
budget. The vertical axis represents a second continuous 
policy dimension , say the size of the defense budget. The 
points labelled 1 1 ，工 2 ' and 13 represent the ideal , or most 
preferred , points for each of three leg工 slators. Assume that 
each legislator prefers points that are closer rather than 
further from his or her ideal point. 1mag工ne that the status 
quo point is exactly the ideal point of legislator two ，工 2 • 
What do we expect to happen if a pol 工 cy combination (x , y) is 
to be chosen by a majority rule vote? 
The circular arc centered at 1 1 and passing through the 
status quo point is an "indifference curve" for legislator one 
in the sense that it represents all the points that she finds 
equally satisfactory to 七 he status quo. Legislator one 
prefers any point 工ns 工 de the arc because it is closer to her 
ideal poin七 The other circle arc similarly represents points 
of indifference to the status quo for legislator three. The 
intersection of these arcs , the shaded area labelled WI 2 , 
represents all the points that both legisla七or one and 
legislator two prefer to the status quo. Thus , if each 
legislator voters his or her sincere preferences r then any 
proposa工 w工 th工n WI 2 would beat the status quo two votes to one. 
The fundamental social choice problem arises because , 
through a similar procedure r we can find proposals that beat 
the new sta七us quo. There is no equ工工工brium because any 
policy can be beaten in a majority rule vote by alternatives. 
1ndeed , Richard McKelvey (工 976) shows tha七 if one of the 
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legislators has control over the agenda , he or she can , by 
successively proposing alternatives to the previous winning 
proposal , eventually secure any point in the policy space 
including his or her ideal point. Thus , there is either no 
equilibrium or one induced by giving control of the agenda to 
one legislator. 
The institution of an "agenda setter" is one way to 
induce an equilibrium. Kenneth Shepsle (工 979) began a line of 
research that explores the various institutional arrangements 
that can induce an equilibriurn. For exarnple , consider the 
delegation of authority to cornrnittees such that each one has 
cornplete authority over one of the policy dirnensions. 工n
Figure 工 the points x} , x 2 , and x 3 represent the legislators' 
ideal points on the single dimension decided by a comrnittee. 
工 n this case , the Median Voter Theorern gives X2 as the 
equilibrium. Sirnilarly , the comrnittee with authority over the 
other policy dimension would select Y2 by majority rule vote. 
An equilibrium corre sponding to 1 2 would emerge as long as the 
committee structure guaranteed that only votes involving 
changes in one dimension at a time occurred. ll 
Spatial models provide a frarnework for thinking 
systematically about political strategy. William Riker (1986) 
describes Heresthetics , the art of political manipulation , in 
terms of agenda control , strategic voting (voting against 
one's true preferences to obtain a more favorable outcome in 
future votes) , and the manipulation of policy dimensions. 
Heresthetics can help public managers find strategies for 
getting more favorab工 e results frorn the various political 
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arenas in which they operate. 工 t can also contribute to more 
effective organizationa工 design.
Consider , for example , the recent success that the 
Department of Defense has had in closing unnecessary military 
bases (Weimer , 1992). Between 1976 and 1989 virtually no 
military bases were closed. But 工n 工 988 ， Congress delegated 
authority for formulating the set of bases to be closed to a 
commission. Congress further 工mposed a closed rule (no 
amendments are permitted) on the recommendations of commission 
and exempted the proposed closures from environmental impact 
statement requirements that could be used to move the 
decisions from the legislat 工ve to the judicial arena. As a 
result of these institutional changes , bases are now being 
closed. 
Game-Theoretic Models of 工nstitutions
工口 common usage , lnst 工 tut 工ons general 工y refer to the 
rules of society , whether formal or informal , that constrain 
individual behavior. But why do people obey the rules when 
violating 七 hem may be in their immediate in七 erests? Returning 
to Figure 1 , for instance , in the case of commi七 tee
jurisdic 七 ion over policy dimensions , why is it that 
legislators one and three do not vote to suspend the rules so 
as to be able to propose alternatives they find desirable to 
the status quo? Resorting to some external authority , such as 
judicial interpretation of a constitution , gives only a 
partial answer because it raises the question of why the 
external authority is accepted. The most general theory of 
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institutions should explain why a set of rules is constraining 
without resor七 to some external authority. In other words , 
the ru工 es comprising the institution should be self-enforcing 
in the sense that individuals voluntarily accept them. 
The elements of an economic theory of institutions that 
meets these requirements were introduced by Andrew Schotter 
(1981) , who views institutions , including such informal rules 
as conventions and norms , as equilibr工a 工n repeated 
noncooperative games. A social situation is represented as a 
one-stage game involving either a cooperation or coordination 
problem so that the equilibrium strategies of the players lead 
to an outcome that is Pareto inefficient. 工 f this stage game 
is repeated indefinitely , however , then , with appropriate 
assumptiôns about the knowledge and discount rates of the 
players , equilibria can result that 工nvolve varying degrees of 
coopera七 ion ， often including ones that achieve Pareto 
efficiency. 斗 2
By far the most commonly employed stage game 工 s the well 
known prisoners' dilemma , characterized by an equilibrium 
involving "defection" by both players whereas "cooperation" by 
both players would be Pareto efficien七.工 f the game is 
repeated such that the players do not know the last period of 
play with certainty , then there may be many possible 
equilibria that lead to Pareto efficient levels of cooperation 
depending on their discount rates , the probabil 工ty that the 
game continues from one period to the next , and the payoff 
structure of the stage game. For example , plausible 
assumptions often make mutual play of the well known "tit-for-
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tat" strategy (cooperate in the first period , then play the 
stage-game strategy that your opponent played in the previous 
period) an equilibrium that results in continuous cooperation. 
Though most of this literature is at least a step away 
from modelling real institutions , one exceptional work shows 
the possibilities for application. paul Milgrom , Douglass 
North , and Barry Weingast (1990) consider the problem of trade 
in the Middle Ages , which was characterized by infrequent 
interactions among a large number of traders. They show how a 
cooperative equilibrium involving a third party who keeps 
records about contract compliance can result. The record 
keeper corresponds closely to the historical institution of 
the law merchan七.
David Kreps (1990) and Gary Miller (工 992) make an 
工mportant connect 工on between the econom工 c theory of 
institutions and leadership. They note that repeated games 
generally have multiple equilibria; indeed , the so-called 
"folk theorem" states that repeated games can even have an 
infinite number of equilibria. If many different equilibria 
are possible , then a coordination problem arises: How can the 
players know which strategies to play so that one of the more 
desirable equilibria results? An effective leader provides a 
vision of one of the desirable equilibria and communicates it 
to the members of the organization. She thus facilitates 
effective coordination by giving mernbers consistent 
expecta仁 ions about each other's behavior. Symbols may play a 
role in creating the shared expectations; so too might the 
personal interaction achieved through "management by walking 
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around." 
The importance of the credibi1ity of manageria1 
commitments becomes apparent in viewing organizations as 
repeated games. Members must anticipate not on1y that if they 
make contributions to the co11ective endeavor that others wi11 
as we11 , but that they w工 11 not be disadvantaged in future 
p1ays because they have revea1ed information that 1eaves them 
vu1nerab1e to exp1oitation. Mi11er (工 992) I in work co-
authored with Jack Knott ，工11ustrates 七he importance of 
credib1e commitment through an ana1ysis of piece-rate 
incentives , a contract form favored more by economic theory 
than actua1 use. Work groups , fearing a ratcheting down of' 
piece rates and potentia1 1ayoffs , genera11y create norms to 
1imit output. The rare organization that effective1y uses 
piece-rates probab1y does so by convincing workers that they 
have job security and by giving them a ro1e in the setting of 
rates. A corporate cu1ture consisting of a set of norms about 
how workers w工 11 be treated , may be va1uab1e in giving 
credibi1ity to the commitments by individua1 managers whose 
tenure 工 s uncerta 工 n.
Corporate cu1ture can a1so be viewed in the context of 
incomplete contracts (Kreps , 1990). 工 t communicates genera1 
princip1es for dea1ing with unanticipated contingencies and 
provides a basis for eva1uating performance ex post. 
Maintaining a genera11y valuable corporate culture may explain 
what otherwise appears as inappropriate managerial rigidity: 
support for its princip1es , even when they 1ead to specific 
outcomes that are not in the best interests of the involved 
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Tab1e 1 
Overview of Economic Concepts of Potentia1 Use to Pub1ic Management Research 
Economic Approach Area of App1ication Centra1 Not 工 on
Neoc1assica1 We1fare 
Economlcs 
Market fai1ures occur when vio1ations of 
the assumptions of the competitive 
framework 1ead to equ 工 1 工 br 工 a that are not 
Pareto efficient 
Administrative ru1es and 
incentives to increase efficiency 
of intra-organizationa1 markets: 
solving organizationa1 pub1ic 
good , common property resource , 
and natura1 monopo1y prob1ems 
Neoinstitutiona1 
Econom工 cS:
Agency Theory 
Contracts structure the re1ationship 
between principa1s and agents to minimize 
agency cost , whiGh is the sum of the 
costs of structuring , monitorin弓 and
bonding contracts and the 10ss from 
residua1 discretion 
Organizationa1 design: creating 
incentives for the production and 
reve1ation of information that 
improve the efficiency of intra-
and inter-organizationa1 
transactions 
Neoinstitutiona1 
Econom工 cS:
Transaction Cost Theory 
Socia1 Choice Theory 
工nstitutiona1 arrangements economize on 
transaction cost: the sum of pre 一 contract
bargaining and post-contract comp1iance 
(opportunism) costs 
Socia1 choice ru1es are prone to 
disequi1ibriumj institutiona1 structure 
may induce equi1ibrium 
Organizationa1 design: creating 
hostages , bonds , and other 
mechanisms for generating credib1e 
commitment and discouraging 
opportun工 sm
Organizationa1 design and 
po1itica1 strategy: obtaining 
substantive outcomes through the 
manipulation of procedura1 ru1es 
Fι o y r o es hn TO 
-l 
ct ﹒工
u
mt o--nt os cn E工 工nstitutions are equi1ibria in repeated 
gamesj equilibria are rarely unique 
Corporate cu1ture and leadership: 
creating focal points for more 
efficient organizational 
已空空ilibria
parties in any particular situation , may make their continued 
application more credible. This view of corporate culture 
raises a number of interesting design questions. For example , 
if it is important for an organization to have a single 
corporate culture , then should the substantive jurisdictions 
of public organiza七 ions be limited so that the principles 
comprising their corporate cultures will be appropriate for 
dea工 ing with the types of unanticipated consequences they are 
likely to face? 
Though the practical consequences of interpreting 
leadership and corporate culture in terms of repeated games 
are not yet clear , we think that this approach provides a 
promising conceptual foundation for generalizing about these 
important but elusive phenomena. 
[Table 工 about here] 
Conclusion 
A variety of economic literatures , summarized in Table 工，
inform organizational design. The market failure framework , 
so central to welfare economics , can be easily applied to 
diagnose , and perhaps remedy , commonly encountered 
organizational problems. The neoinstitutional literatures 
focussing on agency and transaction costs bring theory a step 
closer to providing practica工 concepts for organizational 
design. The social choice and institu七 ional theory 
literatures offer deep conceptual foundations not only for 
organizational design but also for some important aspects of 
the executive function. As these literatures are continu工ng
to grow , they have prospects for offering more to public 
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management in the future. 
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Endnotes 
1. Relaxing these assurnptions has both positive and norrnative 
irnplications: it allows analysts to rnake predictions about the 
consequences of d工 fferences 工n institutional arrangernentsi it 
also brings into question the interpretation of efficiency in 
neoclassical welfare theory by treating institutional 
arrangernents as a rnatter of choice rather than taking thern as 
given (Bromley , 1989). 
2. For a discussion of inforrna七 ion asyrnrnetry as a rnarket 
failure , see Vining and Weirner (工 988) . 
3. Neoinstitutional econornics can be thought of as a subset of 
what has been called the "new institutional economics." The 
latter includes rnodels that relax the assumption of individual 
rationality central to neoclassical econornic theory. For 
exarnple , Oliver Williamson (工 985) conceives of transaction 
cost theory as broadly including bounded rationality and 
therefore a part of the new institutional economics. In this 
essay , because of our definition of economics , we lirnit our 
attention to that part of transaction cost theory that 
preserves the assumption of individual rationality. 
4. Empirical research in four areas -- corporate control , 
vertical integration , managerial compensation , and 
organizational structure of corporations -- has been "mostly 
confirmatory . " See Hesterly , Liebeskind , and Zenger (1990) 
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for a review. 
5. In this framework , management involves monitoring the 
execution of contracts and providing appropriate direction to 
organizational members when unspecified contingencies arise. 
6. Elements of the model were introduced by Robert Wilson 
(1968) in the theory of syndicates and by M工 chael 8pence and 
Richard Zeckhauser (工 97 工 in the 工 r article on 工nsurance and 
information. 
7. We are reminded of the story of the men in a balloon who 
had become lost. They shouted to a man below: "Where are we?" 
He responded: "In a balloon." They concluded he must be an 
economist because he was precise but unhelpful. 80 far , the 
formal principal-agent literature has been more valuable 工n
providing precise specifications of a variety of information 
asymme tries , such as hidden information and hidden action , 
than in informing practical issues of design. 
8. The relative efficiency of ' giving residual rights to the 
various parties in situations of incomplete contracts provides 
an explanation for ownership of assets in organizations. See 
Klein , Crawford , and Alchian (1978) and Grossman and Hart 
(1986) . 
9. Robert Biller (1976) advocated the establishment of 
"savings banks" to allow carry-over of some fraction of 
37 
unspent funds to avoid the end of period rush to spend the 
budget. 
工 O. For an excellent overview of spatial models , see Krehbiel 
(工 988) . 
11. Viewing one of the committees as a agency , say controlling 
the policy dimension corresponding to the speed of 
implementat 工 on ， prov工des a way of thinking about the nature 
and stability of administrative discretion (see Hill ，工 985) . 
工 2. For excellent overviews of this approach to the study of 
institutions , see Calvert (1995a ，工 995b) . 
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